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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public corporation, et 
al. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 8469 
PRELI:J.IINARY STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court of the State of Ptah and the 
Supreme Court of the -c nited States have both ruled 
directly on the controlling principle of law which sets 
at rest any factual matters claimed to be involved by 
appellant. The trial court properly granted the Board of 
Education's motion for summary judgment on the basis 
of Railroad vs. Stringham, 38 Utah 113, 110 P. 868, and 
Gonzales vs. French 164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 102 41 L. 
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Ed. 458. These cases were cited below in defendant's .,, 
written brief but appellant has not mentioned them to 
this court. 
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is 
incomplete but correct as far as it goes. The land 
involved herein is a ten acre tract lying in the North-
e.ast Quarter of Section 16, Township 1 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and being situated west of 
19th East Street and north of Kensington A venue in Salt 
Lake City. The issue is whether or not the land was 
reserved to the Territory of Utah for school purposes 
under the Organic Act of 1850, so that title thereafter 
passed to the State of Utah upon its admission to the 
Union under the Enabling Act of 1894. 
Defendant holds title under a patent from the State 
of Utah (Abstract entries N'o. 25 and 83) while plaintiff's 
recent application for federal patent was rejected. (R. 
50-52) Plaintiff is the remote successor in interest of 
an e.arly settler who, plaintiff contends, was possibly 
in possession as early as 100 years ago and that the pre-
emptive right of such settler has continued in effect to 
the present day and now compels the State of Utah to 
select other lands "in lieu'' of this particular tract. For 
the convenience of the court, counsel for the defendant 
has prepared a sununary of the abstract which is entitled 
"Chain of Title" and is filed at pages 62 and 63 of the 
Judgment Roll. 
The n1ost pertinent fact ·which plaintiff refrains 
from ~tating is that none of his predecessors in interest 
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3 
ever filed a declaratory statement under the pre-emption 
laws of intention to obtain patent from the U.S.A. (R. 
50, 51) The federal statutory law of pre-emption upon 
which plaintifi relies makes such procedure a necessary 
prerequisite in order that the settler's possessory claim 
might be perfected and prevent title to the school lands 
involved from passing to the State of Utah. 
The parties will be referred to as the plaintiff (Ren-
nold Pender) and the defendant (Board of Education 
of Salt Lake City). 
These parties are the only ones taking part in this 
appeal. Romney Lumber Company deeded its interest 
to the Board of Education (abstract entry No. 83) and 
has taken no further action in connection with the law-
suit. The Board of Education was substituted as a party 
defendant in place of Romney Lumber Company under 
Rule 25 (c) U.R.C.P. Salt Lake County was originally 
joined as a party defendant, but filed its Disclaimer. 
The State of Utah was made a third party defendant by 
Romney Lumber Company, but the issues framed by 
such pleadings have become moot in view of the Decree 
quieting the title of Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
TITLE TO THE TRACT INVOLVED PASSED FROM THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR PATENT FROM THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAS REJE-CTED BY THE 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THIS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DECISION IS BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF AND 
UPON THIS COURT. 
POINT III. 
PLANTIFF CANNOT OBTAIN TITLE TO THE SCHOOL 
SECTION BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE 
UNITED STATES OR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT IV. 
THE STATE PATENT TO ROMNEY LUMBER COM-
PANY AND PAYMENT OF' TAXES BY IT BARS PLAIN-
TIFF FROM OBTAINING TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSES-
SION AGAINST SAID PATENTEE. 
ARGlT~IENT AND ArTliORITIES 
POINT I. 
TITLE TO THE TRACT INVOLVED PASSED FROM THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Defendant agrees with all the law cited in plaintiff's 
brief to the effect: 
'' . . . that if there is any genuine issue as to 
any material fact, the motion (for summary judg-
ment) should be denied." Young et al. YS. Felor-
nia, Utah, ~lay 195~. ~-!-! P. 2d St)~, 863. 
Plaintiff contends that there is an issue of fact 
as to when John Prye or D. Hendrix first settled on 
the land with a view to pre-en1ption. The official plat 
of thP survC'y of Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake :Meridian, shows that it was filed with and accepted 
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5 
by the Surveyor General for Utah on September 10, 
1856. (R. 50, 51) On February 25, 1868 the Territorial 
Surveyor certified that "John Poy (or Prye) is the law-
ful claimant of Lots 16 and 17." (Abstract Entry No.1) 
However the Big Field Five Acre Plat (R. 66) introduced 
into evidence by plaintiff states that it was: 
"copied from Old Plot by Leo Hawkins, G.S.L. 
Co. Recorder 1857" 
and plaintiff claims that it is only reasonable to infer 
that the owner as shown thereon of Lots 16 and 17, 
Block 13 (D. I-Iendrix) was in possession prior to Sep-
tember 10, 1856, the date the official U.S. Survey was 
filed. Plaintiff argues about the condition of the weather 
in the fall of 1856, the meaning of the word "old" and 
asks this court to gloss over the fact that there is no 
deed of possession from D. Hendrix to John Prye. But 
for the purpose of sustaining the motion for sun1mary 
judgment, plaintiff's claim that D. Hendrix is his earliest 
predecessor in title and that such person settled on the 
land with a view to pre-emption prior to Septen1ber 10, 
1856 may be assumed to be correct. 
In any event the abstract shows: That hy mesne 
conveyances the possessory interest of John Prye was 
transferred to George Saxton and C. S. Patterson; that 
in 1923 auditor's tax deeds to Salt Lake County were 
issued for 1918 delinquent taxes; that in 1923 Salt Lake 
County quitclaimed its interest to the State of Utah for 
"no money" inasmuch as the Board of County Commis-
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sioners was advised that the property was "State Land 
erroneously assessed." (R. 70) In 1943 the State patented 
the property to Romney Lumber Company and in 1952 
plaintiff acquired quitclaim deeds from the heirs of Sax-
ton and Patterson. Plaintiff's complaint was filed May 
6, 1952, two days before the one year grace period ex-
pired as provided for in the new four year statute of 
limitations on tax titles. 
The solution to this case does not depend upon the ~ 
date of earliest possession or any modern statute. It 
is governed by the provisions of the statutes concerning 
pre-emptive rights (Chapter 4, Title 32, Revised Statutes 
of 1878) and the decisions of the Supreme Courts of 
Utah and the United States construing the same. The 
law is explicit that: 
"Every claimant under the pre-emption law 
. . . is required to make known his claim in writ-
ing to the register of the proper land-office within 
three months from the time of the settlement ... " 
Sec. 2265 Rev. Stat. 1878 ( 3 March 1843 ; 5 Stat. 
620) 
"In regard to settlements which are author-
ized upon unsurveyed lands, the pre-emption 
claimant shall be in all cases required to file his 
declaratory statement within three months from 
the date of the receipt at the district land-office 
of the approved plat of the township embracing 
such pre-e1nption settlement." Sec. 2266, Rev. 
Stat. 1878 (30 nfay 1SG2, 12 Stat . .JlO) 
A~ stated in the affidavit of nir. Ernest E. House, 
1\lanager of the Bureau of Land Management, Land Of-
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east Quarter of Section 16, Township 1 South, Range l 
East, shows that none of plaintiff's predecessors in in-
terest ever filed an application for homestead entry or 
declar.atory staten1ent of pre-emptive claim. This af-
fidavit is uncontroverted and under the two very pertin-
ent decisions of Railroad vs. Stringham and Gonzales 
1.:s. French, the failure of the pre-emptive claimant to file 
his declaratory statement, caused the title to the sec-
tion 16 tract, here involved, to be reserved to the Terri-
tory of Utah pursuant to the Organic Act of 1850. The 
possessory claim of John Prye was not diligently pro-
secuted and failed to ripen into any type of title which 
can now be asserted by plaintiff. 
In the settlement scheme of the western states, the 
first settler upon the land who was the head of a family 
and who erected a dwelling house and improved and 
inhabited such premises had a preference right to pur-
chase and acquire patent to 160 acres upon paying the 
prescribed fee and filing his claim under the pre-emption 
laws. (Chapter 4, title 32, Revised Statutes of 1878) The 
statutes establishing pre-emptive rights date back at 
least to !1.arch 3, 1803 ( 2 Stat. 229) and recognized the 
elaim to possession of the first person to inhabit and im-
prove the lands lying along the western frontier. The 
homestead entry may, but need not have been based on 
such prior inhabitation. The pre-mnptive claimant was 
offered first chance to buy the land to protect his in-
vestments and improvements, etc. 
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In 1841, Congress re-enacted the laws on pre-emp-
tion and provided in section 10 : 
" ... no lands reserved for the support of schools 
. . . shall be liable to entry under and by virtue 
of the provision of this act." (Sept. 4, 1841, 5 
Stat. 456) 
This of course raised a problem, for the early pio-
neers were settling upon the land well in advance of any 
public survey and no one knew whether in fact they were 
located upon land which after government survey was 
accomplished might turn out to be section sixteen or 
thirty-six. In 1859 Congress passed a provision to al-
leviate this situation, but in the meantime the Territory 
of Utah was created by the Organic Act (9 Stat. 453; 
published at page 80, volume 1, U.C.A. 1953) Section 15 
of this act provided : 
"That when the lands in the said Territory 
shall be surveyed under the direction of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, preparatory to 
bringing the same into market, sections numbered 
sixteen and thirty-six in each township in said 
Territory shall be, and the same a're hereby, re-
served for the purpose of being applied to schools 
in said Territory, and in the States and Terri-
tories hereafter to be erected out of the same." 
On this same day Congress passed a similar statute 
which stated: 
"Sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six, in 
each township of the territories of New Mexico, 
I"' 
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Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana 
and Wyoming shall be reserved for the purpose 
of being applied to schools in the several Terri-
tories herein named, and in the States and Terri-
tories hereinafter to be erected out of the same." 
(9 Stat. 452; Sec. 1946, Rev. Stat. 1878) 
Subsequently, in 1891 sections 2 and 32 in each townshig 
were added to this proviso ( 26 stat. 796; Republished 
in 43 U.S.C.A. Sec. 853.) 
Also in 1891 ( 3 March 1891, 26 Stat. 1097) the laws 
on pre-emption (Chapter 4, Title 32, Rev. Stat. of 1878) 
were repealed except sections 2275, 2276 and 2286. This 
repe.aling act provided that all bona fide pre-emptive 
claims which had been initiated, may be perfected upon 
due compliance with law. 
The act of July 16, 1894 (28 Stat. 107) was: "An 
act to enable the people of Utah to form a constitution 
and State government and to be admitted into the Union 
on an equal footing with the original States." Section 6 
of this Enabling Act (published page 64, Vol 1, U.C.A. 
'53) provided : 
"That upon the admission of said State into 
the Union, sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-
two, and thirty-six in every township of said 
proposed state, and where such sect~ons, or any 
parts thereof have been sold or otherwise dis-
posed of by or under the authority of any Act of 
Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in legal 
subdivisions of not less than one quarter section 
and .as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu 
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of which the same is taken, are hereby granted 
to said State for the support of common schools, 
such indemnity lands to be selected within said 
State in such manner as the legislature may pro-
vide, with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior: ... " 
On February 26, 1859 Congress passed the statu-
tory provision concerning pre-emptive rights on school 
lands: 
"Where settlements, with a view to pre-emp-
tion, have been made before the survey of the 
lands in the field, which are found to have been 
made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those sec-
tions shall be subject to the pre-emption claim of 
such settler; and if they, or either of them, have 
been or shall be reserved or pledged for the use 
of schools or colleges in the State or Territory 
in which the lands lie, other lands of like quantity 
are appropriated in lieu of such as may be pat-
ented by pre-emptors ... " (26 Feb. 1859, 11 Stat. 
385; Sec. 2275, Rev. Stat. 1878; slightly revised 
and republished in 43 U.S.C.A. Sec. 851) 
Plaintiff's entire claim to title is based upon this 
provision; he contends that he is the successor of D. 
Hendrix, who settled on the land with a Yiew to pre-
emption. 
To review the 1natter chronologically; the pre-emp-
tion law of 1841 reserved school lands from the operation 
of that act; in 1850 the Organic Act reserved Section 16 
for school purposes in the lTtah Territory; we assume 
(for the purpose of the motion for surmnary judgment) 
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that in 1855 D. Hendrix was a settler with a view to pre-
emption who inhabited and improved the tract involved; 
in 1856 the official survey of the area w.as filed and ac-
cepted; hence at that time the location of the boundary 
lines of section 16 became known; in 1859 Congress pro-
vided for lieu land selections by the Territory where 
settlements with a view to pre-emption had been made 
on sections 16 or 36 before the survey of the lands in 
the field, and in 1843 and 1862 sections 2265 and 2266 
respectively of the Revised Statutes of 1878 were passed 
which required the pre-emption claimant in all cases to 
file his declaratory statement within three months from 
the filing date of the township plat. 
This is the identical sequence of events ruled upon 
m Gonzales v. French, decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in 1896, 164 U.S. 338, 17 S. Ct. 102 
41 L. ed. 458. Emma Gonzales claimed to be the owner 
of a 120 acre tract forming part of section 16, T. 21 N., 
R. 7 E., of the Gila and Salt River Meridian (in Flagstaff, 
Arizona). The pertinent facts, as stated by the court, 
were: 
"In 1878 a survey in the field was made of 
the township in which the lands in dispute were 
situated, which survey, together with a plat of 
the same, was approved February 3, 1879. At the 
time of the survey McMillan and Farriner were 
residing on and cultivating lands constituting a 
portion of section 16, and in 1883 Emma J. Gon-
zales, the plaintiff in error, purchased from said 
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12 
occupants their improvements, took possession of 
the land, and errected additional improvements 
thereon." (emphasis added) 
Although this school section was reserved (but not 
granted) to the Territory, Congress in 1889 granted the 
South Half of Section 16, to probate Judge French to 
hold said lands as a townsite, in trust for the occupants 
of the town of Flagstaff. ~Irs. Gonzales protested the 
action of the local land officers in allowing Judge 
French's entry and after fruitless appeals to the General 
Land Office and to the Secretary of Interior, she sued 
to quiet title in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court held: 
"The claim of the plaintiff in error, there-
fore, to a right of pre-emption, was fatally de-
fective because her vendors and predecessors in 
title had failed to make or file an actual entry 
in the proper land office. As they did not choose 
to assert their rights by filing a declaratory state-
Jnent, or by making an entry as pre-emptioners, 
their 1nere possession did not prerent the rights 
of t.Jz.e territory from attaching to the school sec-
tions 1chen the sttrvey 1cas made. Xor did the 
plaintiff in error lawfully succeed to any posses-
sory rights they may have had, as against the 
lTnited States, because such rights were merely 
personal to the settler, and, under lT. S. Rev. Stat. 
Sec. 2263, were not assignable to the plaintiff in 
error. She did not herself, after taking possession, 
comply with the requisitions of the law. 
"Section 2265, Revised Statutes, provides 
that 'every clain1ant under the pre-e1nption law for 
land not yet proclai1ned for sale is required to 
1nake known his clain1 in writing to the register 
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of the proper land office within three months from 
the time of the settlement, giving the designation 
of the tract and the time of settlement; otherwise 
his claim shall be forfeited and the tract awarded 
to the next settler, in the order of time, on the 
same tract of land, who has given such notice and 
otherwise complied with the conditions of the law;' 
and Sec. 2266 provides that 'in regard to settle-
ments which .are authorized upon unsurveyed 
lands, the preemption claimant shall be in all 
cases required to file his declaratory statement 
within three months from the date of the receipt 
at the district land office of the approved plat 
of the township embracing such pre-emption settle-
ment;' and section 2267 provides that 'all claim-
.ants of pre-emption rights, under the two preced-
ing sections, shall, when no shorter time is pre-
scribed by law, make the proper proof and pay-
ment for the lands claimed within thirty months 
after the date prescribed therein, respectively, for 
filing their declaratory notice, has expired.' 
"The bill discloses that the plaintiff in error 
first appeared in the land office and proposed to 
file her declaratory statement on April 2, 1885, 
more than six years after the filing of the plat. 
"The register and receiver were therefore 
warranted in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff 
in error." 
The above quoted decision conclusively bars plain-
tiff's complaint to quiet title. The principle therein an-
nounced was subsequently declared to be the law in 
rtah. In Rio Grande Western Railway Company v. 
Stringham et al., 38 Utah 113, 110 Pac. 868, the facts 
were as follows: 
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In 1870 George Stringham, and Dorr Curtis settled 
upon unsurveyed public lands west of Sandy, Utah. In 
1873 the lands were surveyed and the plat was filed in 
the Land Office in August, 1874. In 1873 the Bingham 
Canyon and Camp Floyd Railroad built its road from 
Sandy to Bingham, and in 1875 and 1876, a copy of the 
articles of incorporation and a profile .and map of the 
road were filed with the Secretary of the Interior. No 
declaratory statement announcing his intention to obtain 
patent under the pre-emptive laws was filed by String-
ham untill 1883. Some time later the Rio Grande R. R. 
acquired the Bingham and Camp Floyd R. R. and a quiet 
title suit was prosecuted. The opinion states: 
"It is contended that the decisive questions 
on the .appeal are : ( 1) Were the lands in ques-
tion, and upon and across which plaintiff's pred-
ecessor constructed its road, public lands when 
it filed its articles of incorporation with the Sec-
retary of the Interior, and its profile and map 
with the register of the district land office, and 
undertook to avail itself of the benefits of the 
actf' 
* * * 
"Curtis filed no declaratory statement, and 
made no entry in the land office. He sold his 
possessory rights to George Stringham in 1875. 
Stringham filed no declaratory statement, and 
made no entry in the land office until the 12th 
day of June, 1883. These claimants failing to 
assert their rights by the filing of a declaratory 
statement, or by 1naking an entry as pre-emptors, 
! 
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within the prescribed time after the receipt at 
the district land office of the township plat, ac-
quired no prior rights by virtue of their settle-
ment and occupancy, and their failure to file such 
declaratory statements left the lands subject to 
disposition by the United States as before their 
occupancy. 
"The Supreme Court of the United States, in 
the case of Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 232, 9 Sup. 
Ct. 509, 32 L. ed. 920, held that a settlement upon 
public lands in .advance of a public survey is al-
' lowed to parties who, in good faith, intend, when 
the surveys are made and returned to the local 
land office, to apply for their purchase; and, when 
the public surveys are made and returned, the 
land, not having been in the meantime withdrawn, 
c.an be acquired and purchased by them by the 
filing of a declaratory statement within the time 
and by pursuing the steps prescribed by law. 
The court there said: 'If those steps are from 
any cause not taken, the proffer of the govern-
ment has not been accepted, and a title in the oc-
cupant is not even initiated. The title to the land 
remains unaffected, and subject to the control 
and disposition of the government, as before his 
occupancy. This doctrine has been long estab-
lished in this court.' To the same effect are Nor-
thern Pac. Ry. Co. v DeLacey, 17 4 U.S. 622, 19 
Sup. Ct. 791, 43 L. ed. 1111 ; Gonzales v. French, 
164 U. S. 338, 17 Sup. Ct. 102, 41 L. ed. 548; 
Osborne v. Altschul (C.C.), 101 Fed. 739. We 
therefore say that the lands in question were 
public lands when plaintiff's predecessor, in 1875, 
filed its articles of incorporation with the Secre-
tary of the Interior, and when the profile and 
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map of its road were filed by it in the district [1 
land office, and approved by the Secretary of 
the Interior on the 20th day of October, 1876." 
A landmark case concerning the necessity of the 
pre-emptive claimant filing a declaratory statement of 
intention to obtain patent is that of Frisbie vs. Whitney, 
9 Wall. 187, 19 L. ed. 668. The holding of that case is 
that occupation and improvement of the public lands with 
a view to pre-emption does not confer a vested right in 
the land occupied, nor a right against the government. 
A vested right under the pre-emption laws is obtained 
only when the purchase money has been paid, and the 
receipt of the proper land officer given to the purchaser; 
and until this is done, such lands are under the control of 
Congress. 
The only case which plaintiff cites and claims to bP-
contr.ary to the above decisions is Hamblin vs. State 
Board of Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 Pac. 178. 
In that case a survey in 1918 of lands near Kanab, l~tah 
revealed that plaintiff Han1blin's improvements and 
cultivated acreage were on state, school lands. His pred-
ecessors in title had been there for forty years, so pur-
suant to Utah law (65-1-31 U.C.A. 1953) Hamblin had 
his Salt Lake attorney prepare an .application to pur-
chase his tract from the State Land Board. This ap-
plication was delivered in the 1nail to I\::anosh rather than 
l{an.ab which caused his subsequent application to be de-
layed and denied because not filed '•within ninety days 
after thP plats of said SUITeys haYe been filed in the 
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United States Land Office." Mr. Hamblin brought an 
original writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of 
Utah to compel the granting of his tardy application. 
This court held that the writ of mandamus would not 
lie to compel the Land Board to perform a discretionary 
function, inasmuch as the statute provided that the settler 
"may be permitted" to purchase such lands. Without any 
reference to its prior Railroad v. Stringham decision the 
court stated that the ninety days filing provision was 
the same as the federal requirement and that: 
"In construing the section of the act of Con-
gress above quoted, (Sec. 2266 Rev. Stat. 1878) 
as far as we have been able to ascertain, the courts 
have uniformly held it to be directory only. The 
cases in mind have all arisen between conflicting 
claimants, and where there were no intervening 
rights as in the case at bar." (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff deleted the last sentence, above italicized, 
from his brief, for the Landsdale vs. Daniels decision, 100 
U. S. 113, 25 L. ed. 587, quoted in the Hamblin case states 
that a filing subsequent to the three month period: 
" ... is held to be operative and sufficient unless 
some other person had previously commenced a 
settlement and given the required notice of claim. 
Johnson vs. Towsley, 13 Wall, 72, 91, 20 L. ed. 
485, 489. 
The Johnson vs. Towsley decision is cited with ap-
proval in Gonzales vs. French and these cases inter-
preted together say in effect that if intervening rights 
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should attach to the land the failure of the pre-emptive 
claimant to make his declaratory statement within the 
three month period, is fatal to perfecting the possessory 
right. Thus in the Hamblin case, there were no interven-
ing rights and the three months proviso was stated to 
be directory and not mandatory while in Gonzales vs. 
French and Railroad vs. Stringham the title of the inter-
venor was held paramount to the unperfected pre-emp-
tive claim. 
The result is that where plaintiffs' predecessors in 
interest, D. Hendrix and John Prye et al., filed no dec-
laratory statement whatsoever, the land, being a school 
section was reserved to the Territory of Utah under th~ 
Organic Act, the date the survey was filed (Sept. 10, 
1856), and was granted to the State under section six 
of the Enabling Act of 1894. The State Land Board 
patented the property to Romney Lumber Comp.any in 
1943 and it was not untill\fay 6, 1952 that Rennold Pen-
der filed the first and only application that has ever 
been made with the Bureau of Land l\fanagement. This 
was 97 years after D. Hendrix was first (assumed to be) 
in possession. Because of such intervening rights this 
application was properly rejected and plaintiff has no 
better position before the courts. 
As stated in Gonzales vs. French: 
"As they did not choose to assert their rights 
by filing .a declaratory statement, or by Inaking 
an entry as pre-emptioners, their n1ere possession 
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did not prevent the rights of the territory from 
attaching to the school sections when the survey 
was made." 
Similarly in Ferry vs. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 Pac. 
571, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
"The decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States establish the following propositions 
of law: First. That the various acts of Congress 
mentioned reserving portions of the public lands 
of the United States to the territories or states 
for the benefit of their people, vest the title of 
such lands so reserved in the territories or states 
when the lands are surveyed, or when they are 
bounded and ascertained." ( 4 Utah at page 537) 
Other decisions which hold that title to the school 
section is reserved to the Territory once the survey is 
accomplished are Dugan v. Montoya, 24 N. Mex. 102, 173 
Pac. 118; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Douglas, 31 Fed. 540; 
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Karges, 169 Fed. 459; Magnolia 
Petroleum Company v. Price, 86 Okla. 105, 206 Pac. 1033. 
The lands involved in the instant action were re-
served to the Territory of Utah under section 15 of the 
Organic Act (see page 8 of this brief), and granted 
to the state under section 6 of the Enabling Act (July 16, 
1894; 28 Stat. 107). No other conclusion can be reached. 
The fact that other settlers did file the required declara-
tion of intent, and received federal patent to other por-
tions of section 16, T. 1 S., R. 1 E., only shows that com-
pliance with the pre-emption requirements w.as rewarded 
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with legal title but in cases of non-compliance the state 
was not required to make lieu selections and its patent 
was valid. 
A further study of the laws on pre-emption show that 
a pre-emptive right to obtain patent was personal and 
such right could not be assigned or transferred. Sec. 
2259 of the Revised Statutes (1878) states: 
"Every person, being the head of a family 
. who has made, or hereafter makes, a settle-
ment in person on the public lands subject to pre-
emption, and who inhabits and improves the 
same . . . " (is entitled to a pre-emptive right) 
( 4 Sept. 1841; 5 Stat. 455) 
Section 2262 of the pre-emption laws provides that 
the claimant must take an oath: 
" . . . that he has not settled upon and improved 
such land to sell the same on speculation, but in 
good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive 
use ... " ( 4 Sept. 1841; 5 Stat. 456) 
In section 2258 it is declared that lands shall not 
be subject to rights of pre-emption that are: 
" ... actually settled and occupied for purposes 
of trade and business, and not for agriculture." 
( 4 Sept. 1841; 5 Stat. 455) 
The lmc is explicit that n.o assignment of the pre-
rntJdli'C ri.1ht may be made. 
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Sec. 2263: 
"Prior to any entries being made under and 
by virtue of the provisions of section 2259, proof 
of the settlement and improvement thereby re-
quired shall be made to the satisfaction of the 
register and receiver of the land district in which 
such lands lie, agreeably to such rules as may be 
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior; and 
all assignments and transfers of the right hereby 
secured, prior to the issuing of t·h:e patent, shall 
be null and void." (Emphasis added) ( 4 Sept. 
1841; 5 Stat. 456). 
See the language in Gonzales vs. French that an assignee 
has no standing as a pre-emptive clain1ant. It might just 
as easily be assumed that John Prye was informed by 
the officials of the District Land Office that the land was 
a known school section, and he being an assignee could 
not succeed in obtaining patent to said tract. 
The court can readily understand why the Bureau of 
Land l\1an.agement rejected plaintiff's application for 
patent where he was not the original personal settler 
upon the lands, but is an assignee, and an extremely 
remote one at best. 
Furthermore, plaintiff has admitted, pursuant to 
defendant's request that he is the owner of more than 
320 .acres of land in the State of Utah. (R. 45, 46) Sec-
tions 2260 and 2262 (Rev. Stat. 1878) declare that a per-
son shall not be eligible to obtain a pre-emptive right: 
" ... who is the proprietor of three hundred and 
twenty acres of land in any state or territory." 
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POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR PATENT FROM THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAS REJE.CTED BY THE 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THIS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DECISION IS BINDING UPON PLAINTIFF AND 
UPON THIS COURT. 
On May 6, 1952 the same date the complaint was 
filed, plaintiff prosecuted .an application to obtain a 
patent from the United States of America. This applica-
tion was rejected. 
The affidavit of Mr. House (R. 50, 51) states that 
on July 9, 1952 1Ir. Pender was notified of the decision 
of the Bureau of Land 1Ianagement, rejecting his ap-
plication for patent, and that no appeal was taken from 
such decision. A copy of the letter notifying Mr. Pender 
that the lands had been granted to the State of Utah as 
a school section is attached to Mr. House's affidavit. 
(R. 52) 
The Rules and Regulations of the Bureau of Land 
l\1anagement provide as follows: 
Section 221.50 (b) "Upon failure to serve 
and file notice of appeal as provided in Sections 
221.47 to 221.49 the case will be closed." 
Section 221.51 (a) .. "\Yhen any party fails 
to move for a new trial or to appeal from the 
decision of the n1anager within the time specified, 
such decision shall, as to such p.arty. be final and 
will not lH' disturbed except in case of fraud or 
gross irregularity.'' 
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These regulations are published in 43 Code of Fed-
eral Regulations and are required to be judicially noticed. 
44 U.S.C.A. Sec. 307. See also 78-25-1, U.C.A. '53. 
By virtue of the last-above regulations the admin-
istrative action of the Bure:au of Land Management in 
rejecting plaintiff's application for patent is binding upon 
the plaintiff and upon this court. This principle of ad-
ministrative law has been widely recognized by the courts 
and is stated in Gonzales vs. French as follows: 
"The bill discloses that the plaintiff in error 
first appeared in the land office and proposed to 
file her declaratory statement on April 2, 1885, 
more than six years after the filing of the plat. 
"The register and receiver were therefore 
warranted in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff 
in error. And, at any rate, as she did not appeal 
from their decision to the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office, she must be deemed to have 
acquiesced therein, and is concluded thereby so 
long as it remains unreversed. Wilcox v. Jack-
son, 38 U.S.13 Pet. 511 (10:270)." 
The above stated rule was also cited with approval by 
the Supreme Court of Utah in Railroad v. Stringham, 
38 Utah, at 120: 
"We think that the Secretary of Interior, 
when he received and accepted the articles of in-
corporation of plaintiff's (railroad) predecessor, 
and approved the profile of its road filed with 
the register of" the District Land Office, deter-
mined the question now under consideration. By 
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such acceptance and approval, the Secretary neces-
sarily determined that the act did apply. Thris 
is not a proper proceeding nor forum to review 
that ruling." (Emphasis added.) 
Other decisions which announce the rule that an 
adrninistrative determination upon the facts cannot be 
reviewed in a court of law are U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 
U.S. 61, 25 L. ed. 93; Ross v. Day, 232 U.S. 110, 34 S. Ct. 
233, 58 L. ed. 528; Johnson v. Riddle, 240 U.S. 467, 36 S. 
Ct. 393, 60 L. ed. 752; Reed v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 
234 Fed. 207; Pierson v. State Board of Land Corn'rs., 14 
I: 
Idaho 159, 93 Pac. 775 and Ross v. Wright, 29 Old. 186, I 
116 P.ac. 949. For a very interesting and unusual appli- I ;i 
cation of the rule concerning the binding effect of a de-
cision of the Bureau of Land management see In Re W o-
Gin-Up's Estate, 57 Utah 29, 192 Pac. 267. 
Mr. House, having custody of the official tract book 
which showed no pre-emptive claiin ever having been 
entered, ruled upon the basis of such fact that plaintiff's 
contention of pre-en1ptive right could not possibly oper-
ate in .any 1nanner to upset the sale of the tract by the 
Sate Land Board under its regular procedure. There J 
has been no allegation seeking relief against fraud or ~ 
rnistake. No appeal having been taken by plaintiff from 
the rejection of his application, the decision of the dep.art-
rnent is conclusive upon him. 
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POINT III. 
PLANTIFF CANNOT OBTAIN TITLE TO THE SCHOOL 
SECTION BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE 
UNITED STATES OR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The following cases are cited to button up any con-
tention that plaintiff might have some factual basis to 
title on the theory of adverse possession, or other such 
grounds for reversal of the decree quieting the school 
board's title. 
It is axiomatic that title by adverse possession cannot 
be .acquired against the United States. Jourdan v. Bar-
rett, -1 How. 169, (U.S.) 11 L. Ed. 924; Gibson v. Chout-
eau, 13 Wall 92, (U.S.) 20 L. ed. 534; Bode v. Rollwitz, 
60 :Mont. 481, 199 Pac. 688; Boglino v. Giorgetta, 20 Colo-
rado Appeals 338, 78 Pac. 612; United States v. Eldredge, 
33 F. Supp. 337. 
And in Van lVagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 199 
Pac. 670, the Supreme Court of Utah held that title by 
adverse possession could not be acquired to a school sec-
tion as .against the state. The following headnote correct-
ly reflects the adjudication of that case: 
"Title to land granted to the state by the 
Enabling Act (Act Cong. July 16, 1894), for the 
support of the common schools in the state, can-
not be acquired by adverse possession as against 
the state under Comp. Laws 1917 § 6446, G-t--1:7, 
6449, 6450 (seven ye.ar statute of limitations on 
adverse possession) in view of section 10 of the 
Enabling Act, and in view of Const. Art. 10, § 3, 
Art. 20 § 1, though the state sold the land under 
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section 5575, such statutes of limitation having no 
application to land granted by Congress for the 
support of common schools." 
On page 18 of his brief, plaintiff infers that he has 
been an adverse holder of this tract of land for more 
than 20 years. The brief states that plaintiff: " ... can, 
of course, proceed under Section 1068 United States Code 
Annotated, as amended (Title 43) to secure title ... " 
This act provides that the Secretary of the Interior shall 
issue a patent: 
" whenever it shall be shown to his satis-
faction that a tract of public land has been held 
in good faith and in peaceful, adverse, possession 
by a claimant, his ancestors or grantors, under 
claim or color of title for more than twenty years, 
and that valuable improvements have been placed 
on such land or some part thereof has been re-
duced to cultivation." 
Plaintiff has nez;er been in possession, or held this 
land in good faith for any length of time u:hatsoever. 
He has never placed valuable improvements on such land 
nor cultivated one square foot of it. See plaintiff's An-
swers To Defendant's Request For Ad1nission Of Facts 
at page 45 and 46 of the Judgment Roll. Plaintiff goes 
so far as to contend that his residence at 6721\Iilton Ave. 
somehow rneans in a broad sense that he ''i11habits" this 
tract. 
Hine<' the date of the issuance of state patent to Rom-
ney Lu1nber Comp,any, it has paid all taxes assessed 
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against the property (R. 33) and has paid for all curb, 
gutter, sidewalk and sewer improvements that have been 
made. So far as defendant's counsel is informed, said 
property is vacant. 
POINT IV. 
THE STATE PATENT TO ROMNEY LUMBER COM-
PANY AND PAYMENT OF TAXES BY IT BARS PLAIN-
TIFF FROM OBTAINING TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSES-
SION AGAINST SAID PATENTEE. 
Just in case plaintiff contends that he has acquired 
title by adverse possession against Romney Lumber Co. 
since the state patented the property to it in 1943, defend-
ant has had Ensign Abstract Company prepare a certifi-
cate under date of September 23, 1955, which report of 
the assessment and payment of gener.al taxes for the 
years 1943 to 1954 shows that all taxes and special assess-
ments have been paid by Romney Lumber Company. (R. 
53 to 60 inclusive.) 
Section 78-12-7, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"In every action for the recovery of real prop-
erty, or the possession thereof, the person estab-
lishing a legal title to the property shall be pre-
sumed to have been possessed thereof within the 
time required by law; . . ." 
Hence the patentee, Romney Lumber Company, rnust 
be presumed to have been in possession since the date of 
patent August 7, 1943. 
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Furthermore, section 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953 states: 
"In no case shall adverse possession be con-
sidered established under the provisions of any 
section of this Code, unless it shall be shown that 
the land has been occupied and claimed for the 
period of seven years continuously, and that the 
party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all 
taxes which have been levied and assessed upon 
such land according to law." (Emphasis .added.) 
Defendant Board of Education of Salt Lake City has only 
cited these statutes and presented an abstract of the 
assessment rolls showing payment of all taxes by Rom-
ney Lumber Company to show to the court that there is 
no possible issue of fact concerning the establishment of \. 
title by adverse possession by plaintiff. Neither Rennold 
Pender, nor his predecessors in interest could have ac-
quired title by adverse possession against either of the 
sovereign titleholders, the United States of America or 
the State of Utah, .and the payment of taxes by defend-
ant's grantor precludes the possibility of acquisition of 
title by adverse possession against the individual patentee 
of the State of Utah. 
CONCLlTSION 
Assuming all farts as clailned by plaintiff, no issues 
.are thereby rai8ed, not disposable under the pre-e1nption 
laws. The 1notion for sun1mary judgment was properly 
grantPd and the decree quieting defendant's title should 
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be affirmed by this court. The sum1nary judgment pro-
cedure contained in the new rules has provided an ex-
pedient means of disposing of vexatious litigation. 
Equitably speaking, Emma Gonzales .and Thomas 
B. Stringham stood in a far better position than the 
plaintiff herein. But it has been a policy of the law from 
earliest times that an enfeoffment of some sort be re-
quired to indicate in whom the fee simple was vested. 
Here the very practical and necessary act was to timely 
file a declaratory statement of pre-emptive claim in 
the district land office. The failure to do so, was, no 
doubt, costlier to Gonzales and Stringham than in the 
instant case. There can be no question about the outcome 
of this action in view of the decisions in those two c.ases. 
The Decree should be affirmed with costs awarded 
to this respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
RICHARD H. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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